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Abstract—The “weak” relay-eavesdropper channel was first
studied by Lai and El Gamal, whose achievable scheme intro-
duced noise forwarding (NF) and used backward decoding. We
suggest a novel sliding window decoding scheme with a two
block decoding delay, where the relay uses compress-forward
with Wyner-Ziv (WZ) binning but does not use NF. Wireless
engineers will welcome the reduced decoding delay. Sliding
window decoding mandates multiblock equivocation calculations;
dispensing with NF enables it. We identify nine regimes and
develop a case-by-case choice of relay channel codebook and
WZ bin sizes to maximize the secrecy rate. The multiblock
equivocation calculations may be of independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
The “weak” relay-eavesdropper channel with a trusted relay
and external eavesdropper (Eve) has been the focus of interest
since [1, Theorems 3, 4]. By “weak” is meant a relay that
does not decode-and-forward its received sequence, but one
which compresses and sends the bin index of the compressed
sequence [2]. [1] introduced the idea of NF and generalized
NF (aka GNF), wherein the relay transmits some random
codewords to confuse both the intended receiver (Bob) and
Eve. Eve is affected more than Bob; leading to an increased
secrecy rate. In [1], the relay did not perform WZ binning.
A useful improvement to [1]’s scheme was developed by [3],
who showed that dispensing with the requirement that given
the message, Eve be able to decode the “relay’s” codeword
leads to an increase in secrecy rate. Note that in pure NF
[1, Theorem 3] and in the helping interferer [3], the “relay”
actually doesn’t relay; it acts as an oblivious i.e., deaf helper.
The relay channel has itself been the focus of continued
research interest. Recently, [4] have developed a new de-
coding scheme for the “weak” relay channel. While no rate
improvement was achieved for the canonical relay channel,
they showed an improvement for multi-relay networks. In our
scheme, we use the decoding technique from [4] together with
ideas from [3] and [5].
Both [4], [5] indicate that too high a compression sequence
rate, or too low a relay channel codeword rate can reduce the
message rate. This brings us to the main idea of our paper
i.e., to use compression sequences themselves to interfere with
and confuse Eve by choosing appropriate compression rates
and relay channel codeword, equivalently, WZ binning rates.
Sliding window decoding uses multiblock correlations to
decode, entailing that the equivocation calculation must nec-
essarily also be multiblock. A previous paper by the author [6]
also uses multiblock equivocation (MBEq) in a (dedicated and
trusted) four node relay broadcast channel with two receivers,
each requiring an independent message to be kept secret from
the other. The relay in [6] is a “strong” relay that decodes-
and-forwards the messages to their destinations.
In related work, [7] have considered a “weak” relay-
eavesdropper with long message noisy network coding (LM-
NNC) scheme that also dispenses with NF as we have done
by making use of the insight that judiciously choosing the
number of compression sequences can impact the secrecy rate
achievable. However, they do not employ Wyner-Ziv binning,
and the decoding delay of LM-NNC is B blocks.
II. MODEL: “WEAK” RELAY-EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
The notation is standard, but we describe it here for complete-
ness. The system model is depicted in Fig. 1. We assume a
two receiver discrete memoryless relay-eavesdropper channel
with a confidential message intended for one of the receivers,
with the other acting as an eavesdropper. The finite sets
X1,X2, Y2,Y3,Z respectively represent the channel’s input
at node 1 (the transmitter), at node 2 (the relay), the channel’s
output at nodes 2, 3 (legitimate receiver aka Bob) and 4
(eavesdropper aka Eve). Finally, Yˆ2 represents the alphabet of
the compression random variable. The channel is described by
the conditional probability distribution PY2,Y3,Z|X1,X2 , where
RVs Xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, 2 and Yi ∈ Yi, i = 2, 3 and
Z ∈ Z . The transmitter intends to send an independent
message W ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1}
∆
=W to the receiver Rx Y3 in
n channel uses while ensuring information theoretic secrecy,
defined below. The channel is memoryless and without feed-
back i.e. ∀(x1,x2) ∈
∏2
t=1 X
n
t ,yt ∈ Y
n
t , t = 2, 3, z ∈ Z
n,
P (y2,y3, z|x1,x2) =
n∏
i=1
PY2,Y3,Z|X1,X2(y2i, y3i, zi|x1i, x2i)
The decoding function at Bob ≡ Y3 is a map φ3 : Y
n
3 ×Y
n
3 →
W × W˜ .
A (2nR1 , n, P
(n)
e ) code for the relay-eavesdropper channel
with compress-forward (CF) consists of a (stochastic) en-
coding function at the Tx and an encoding function at the
relay, and a decoding function φ3 at the destination and error
probability P (n)e =
∑
(w,w˜)
Pr[φ3(Y
n
3 ×Y
n
3 ) 6= (w, w˜)|(w, w˜)]
2nR1 × 2nR˜1
Alice p(y2, y3, z|x1, x2)
Bob
Eve
Rel
X1
Y3
Z
W
W
✚❩W
X2Y2
Ŷ2
Fig. 1. Relay-Eavesdropper channel with trusted relay and a confidential
message intended for Bob. RV X2: relay’s input to the channel. RV Y2: the
channel’s output as seen by the relay
A secrecy rate R1 is said to be achievable for the DM relay-
eavesdropper channel if, for any ǫ > 0, ∃(2n[R1+R˜1], n, P
(n)
e )
code s.t. the following requirements are satisfied:
reliability: P (n)e ≤ ǫ
(weak) secrecy: H(W [B−1]|Z[B]) ≥ n(B − 1)R1 − n(B − 1)ǫ
We use the notation [x]+
def
= max{x, 0}.
III. INNER BOUND
The main result of our paper is presented below, namely, that
judicious independent choice of the compression sequence rate
Rˆ and WZ binning rate Rˆ−R2,
1 enables us to maximize the
secrecy rate.
Theorem 1. We first define:
WZBob
def
= I(Yˆ2;X1, Y3|X2), WZ
Eve def= I(Yˆ2;X1, Z|X2)
A (pure secrecy) rate R1 is achievable if there exists
distributions PX1PX2PYˆ2|X2,Y2 s.t. the following hold:
Case 1 : I(X2;Z) +WZ
Eve < I(X2;Y3) +WZ
Bob.
In all Case 1 sub-cases, we choose Rˆ ∈ (I(X2;Z) +
WZEve, I(X2;Y3) +WZ
Bob) and R2 > I(X2;Z3). So Eve
cannot uniquely decode x2, and either decodes it nonuniquely
or treats it as noise, depending on the sub-cases.
Case 1(a) : I(X2;Z)+WZ
Eve < I(X2;Y3)+I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2)
Case 1(a)(i) : I(X2;Z|X1) < I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2).
The choices R2 = max{I(X2;Y3), I(X2;Z|X1)} + ǫ and
Rˆ = I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) − ǫ > I(X2;Z) + WZ
Eve,
enable the secrecy rate R1 = [I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2)−I(X1;Z)]
+.
Case 1(a)(ii) : I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) < I(X2;Z|X1).
The choicesR2 = max{I(X2;Y3), I(X2;Z)}+ǫ, Rˆ as before,
enable R1 =
[
I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2)−[I(X1, X2;Z)−R2]
]+
. The
penalty term can be reduced by choosing ǫ > 0 s.t. R2 ↑ Rˆ.
Case 1(b) : I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) < I(X2;Z) +
WZEve < I(X2;Y3) +WZ
Bob
1Equivalently, of Rˆ and R2
Case 1(b)(i) : I(X2;Z|X1) < I(X2;Y3) + WZ
Bob.
The choices R2 = max{I(X2;Z|X1), I(X2;Y3)} + ǫ(>
I(X2;Z)) and Rˆ ∈ (I(X2;Z) + WZ
Eve, I(X2;Y3) +
WZBob) enable the secrecy rate R1 =
[
I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2) +
I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) − Rˆ − I(X1;Z)
]+
. By choosing
Rˆ ↓ max{I(X2;Z|X1), I(X2;Y3)}, we can obtain rate
R1 =
[
I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2) + I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) −
max{I(X2;Z|X1), I(X2;Y3)} − I(X1;Z)
]+
.
Case 1(b)(ii) : I(X2;Y3) + WZ
Bob < I(X2;Z|X1). The
choices R2 > max{I(X2;Y3), I(X2;Z)} + ǫ and Rˆ ∈
(I(X2;Z)+WZ
Eve, I(X2;Y3)+WZ
Bob) enable the secrecy
rate R1 =
[
I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2) + I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) −
Rˆ − [I(X1, X2;Z) − R2]
]+
. Choosing Rˆ ↓ I(X2;Z) +
WZEve, R2 ↑ Rˆ enables rate R1 =
[
I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2) +
I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2)− I(X1, X2;Z)
]+
Case 2 : I(X2 : Y3) +WZ
Bob < I(X2;Z) +WZ
Eve
Case 2(a) : WZEve < WZBob( =⇒ I(X2;Y3) <
I(X2;Z))
Case 2(a)(i) : WZEve < I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2). The choices R2 ∈
(I(X2;Y3), I(X2;Z)), Rˆ − R2 > WZ
Eve, Rˆ < I(X2;Y3) +
I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) can be made consistent and enable secrecy rate
R1 = [I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2)− I(X1;Z|X2)]
+.
Case 2(a)(ii) : I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) < WZ
Eve < WZBob. Choos-
ing R2 > I(X2;Y3), Rˆ − R2 > WZ
Eve, Rˆ < I(X2;Y3) +
WZBob enables secrecy rate R1 =
[
[I(X1;Y3|X2) −
I(X1;Z|X2)] + [WZ
Bob −WZEve]
]+
.
Case 2(b) : WZBob < WZEve
Case 2(b)(i) : I(X2;Y3) < I(X2;Z). Choosing R2 <
I(X2;Y3), Rˆ > I(X2;Z)+WZ
Eve =⇒ Rˆ−R2 > WZ
Eve
and hence also Rˆ−R2 > WZ
Bob, which enables the secrecy
rate R1 = [I(X1;Y3|X2)− I(X1;Z|X2)]
+.
Case 2(b)(ii) : I(X2;Z) < I(X2;Y3) .
(A) : I(X2;Z) < I(X2;Y3) < I(X2;Z|X1). The choices
R2 ∈ (I(X2;Z), I(X2;Y3)), Rˆ − R2 > WZ
Eve enables
secrecy rate R1 =
[
I(X1;Y3|X2) − [I(X1, X2;Z) − R2]
]+
.
The penalty term is reduced by choosing R2 ↑ I(X2;Y3)
(B) : I(X2;Z) < I(X2;Z|X1) < I(X2;Y3). The choices
R2 ∈ (I(X2;Z|X1), I(X2;Y3)) and Rˆ−R2 as before, enables
secrecy rate R1 = [I(X1;Y3|X2)− I(X1;Z)]
+.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
As is common in secrecy scenarios, the transmitter’s codebook
is divided into bins (aka subcodebooks), with the bin size
intended to confuse Eve. We use [4]’s decoding technique.
Codebook Generation: There are B blocks of transmission.
An independent set of codebooks is generated for each block,
and these are known to all parties involved. Aside from an
additional binning structure, the codebook construction at the
transmitter is almost identical to that in the canonical relay
channel [2], [8]. The transmitter codebook in block b is
given by C
(b)
1 = {x
(b)
1 (w, w˜)|w ∈ [2
nR1 ], w˜ ∈ [2nR˜1 ])}, with
the codewords generated independently using distribution PX1
i.e. x
(b)
1 (w, w˜) ∼
n∏
i=1
PX1(x
(b)
1i ). For a fixed w = 1 (say), the
set x1(1, w˜), w˜ ∈ [2
nR˜1 ] can be thought of as a bin. The relay
channel codebook C
(b)
2 and compression codebook associated
with each relay channel codeword is exactly identical to that
in [2], [8]. |C
(b)
2 | = 2
nR2 . The compression codebook consists
of 2nR2 – i.e., one per relay codeword – satellite codebooks;
each is of size 2nRˆ, and is divided into 2nR2 WZ bins of size
2n[Rˆ−R2]. The generation of the codewords is identical to that
in [2], [8] and is omitted due to space. See [9] for details.
Remark 2. There are two differences with the codebooks used
for NF and GNF in [1]. In [1], the relay does not WZ bin
the compression sequences yˆ2. Further, each yˆ2 is associated
with a set of different possible relay codewords x2 – this is
called NF. Once yˆ2 is known, the choice of x2 to transmit is
determined by the relay’s private randomness. In our scheme,
on the other hand, the relay does WZ bin the yˆ2s, and the
x2 transmitted is wholly determined by the WZ bin of the
previous block’s yˆ2 – private randomness not needed. This
determinism is crucial for the success of the equivocation
calculations. Since this gives a greater degree of control to
the transmitter, we also have reason to believe that this could
lead to an improvement in achievable secrecy rate.
Transmitter Encoding: To send Wj ∈ [1 : 2
nR1 ] in a block b ∈
1, 2, . . . , B − 1, the transmitter chooses uniformly at random
from among 2nR˜1 possibilities for w˜ inside the corresponding
bin Wj . The corresponding codeword x1 is transmitted.
Relay Encoding: The relay encoding is standard [2], [8] i.e.
it looks for a compression codeword that satisfies the joint
typicality condition
(
x2, yˆ2,y2
)
∈ T
(n)
ǫ and then determines
yˆ2’s WZ bin index. The relay codeword corresponding to this
WZ bin is transmitted in the next block.
Decoding at Bob: We use the decoding techniques developed
by [4]. See [9]. These give rise to:
Rˆ< I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;X1, Y3|X2) (1a)
R1+R˜1< I(X1;Yˆ2,Y3|X2) (1b)
R1+R˜1< I(X1;Yˆ2,Y3|X2)
+ [I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) + I(X2;Y3)− Rˆ] (1c)
R1+R˜1< I(X1;Yˆ2, Y3|X2)
+ [I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) + R2 − Rˆ] (1d)
Remark 3. Consider the canonical “weak” relay with no
secrecy requirement i.e., R˜1 = 0, as in [4]. We observe that:
• If Rˆ
α>0
= I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2) + α, then R1 <
I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2)− α i.e. too many compression sequences
reduce achievable rate R1. ([4], [5]).
• If Rˆ < I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2), if in addition R2
β>0
=
Rˆ−I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2)−β, then againR1 < I(X1; Yˆ2, Y3|X2)−β
i.e. too few relay codewords also reduce achievable rate.
• If Rˆ−R2 > WZ
Bob, then Bob cannot uniquely decode yˆ2.
Remark 4. In the “weak” relay-eavesdropper channel, R˜1 6=
0; Rˆ & Rˆ −R2 chosen to maximize secrecy rate: R1
Remark 5. If either (1a) (Bob’s proxy constraint) or
R2 < I(X2;Y3) is satisfied, then Bob can decode x2
uniquely. In Cases 1(a)(i), 1(a)(ii), 2(a)(i), ∵ R2 >
I(X2;Y3), Rˆ < I(X2;Y3) + I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2), of the three
constraints on R1 + R˜1, the tightest constraint is (1b). In
Cases 1(b)(i), 1(b)(ii), 2(a)(ii), ∵ R2 > I(X2;Y3), Rˆ >
I(X2;Y3)+I(Yˆ2;Y3|X2), of the three constraints on R1+R˜1,
the tightest constraint is (1c). In Cases 2(b)(i), 2(b)(ii), con-
straint (1a) is violated, but R2 < I(X2;Y3) still holds. So
Bob uses (x2,y3) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ i.e., single block information to
decode x2, and then conditions on x2 to decode x1 using
(x1,x2,y3) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ at rate R1 + R˜1 ≈ I(X1;Y3|X2). It can
be s.t. decoding yˆ2 nonuniquely would be suboptimal – details
omitted.
Remark 6. In Case 1 i.e., I(X2;Z)+WZ
Eve < I(X2;Y3)+
WZBob, we will always choose Rˆ ∈ (I(X2;Z) +
WZEve, I(X2;Y3) + WZ
Bob), ensuring that Eve’s proxy
constraint, to wit, Rˆ < I(X2;Z) +WZ
Eve is violated, and
by additionally choosing R2 > I(X2;Z), Eve cannot decode
x2 uniquely and consequently cannot decode yˆ2 either.
Remark 7. In Case 1 scenarios, the x2 in the first block is
known to all parties, including Eve. So, in the first block, Eve
can decode x1 at a rate R˜1 ≈ I(X1;Z|X2). However, this
holds only for the first block, creating a boundary effect that
does not affect the overall secrecy rate achievable.
Remark 8. In all Case 2 scenarios i.e., I(X2;Y3)+WZ
Bob <
I(X2;Z) + WZ
Eve, we will choose Rˆ − R2 > WZ
Eve,
thus ensuring that Eve cannot decode yˆ2 uniquely. But in
Case 2a(i), (ii), 2b(i), R2 < I(X2;Z), enabling Eve to de-
code x2 uniquely. Consequently, in these cases only, Eve can
decode x1 at rate R˜1 ≈ I(X1;Z|X2).
Remark 9. In all other cases, whether Eve decodes x2
nonuniquely or treats x2 as noise will be determined by the
exact choices of Rˆ and Rˆ − R2; the choices in turn depend
on the sub-case. Now there are the following possibilities:
1) R2 ∈ (I(X2;Z), I(X2;Z|X1)). Given the message W ,
Eve decodes x2 nonuniquely and decodes x1 uniquely at
rate R˜1 = I(X1, X2;Z)−R2.
2) R2 > I(X2;Z|X1). Given the message W , treat x2 as
noise and decode x1 at rate R˜1 = I(X1;Z)
V. EQUIVOCATION CALCULATIONS
We have separate equivocation calculations for Cases 1,
2(a), 2(b)(ii). Calculation for 2(b)(i) is identical to Case 2(a).
Case 1: I(X2;Z) +WZ
Eve < I(X2;Y3) +WZ
Bob In
this regime, we will always choose Rˆ ∈ (I(X2;Z) +
WZEve, I(X2;Y3) + WZ
Bob), and R2 > I(X2;Z). We
s.t. Term (2)(ii) “small”. The rate of a transmitter bin is
R˜1 ≈ I(X1;Z)I{R2 > I(X2;Z|X2)} + [I(X1, X2;Z) −
R2]I{R2 ∈ (I(X2;Z), I(X2;Z|X1))}. Conditioning on
transmitted Wj is equivalent to knowing the bin and reduces
the number of possibilities for X1,j from 2
n[R1+R˜1] to 2nR˜1 ,
and knowing Zj , enables us to decode X1,j inside the bin
correctly whp, using, in every block j = 1, 2, . . . , B − 1:
• either (x1,j , z(j)) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ i.e. treating x2,j as noise if R2 >
I(X2;Z|X1).
• or (x1,j ,x2,j , z(j)) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ for a unique x1 and some x2 at
a rate I(X1, X2;Z)−R2 if R2 ∈ (I(X2;Z), I(X2;Z|X1)).
In the last block no new message is transmitted and thus
X1,B is known. A standard application of Fano’s inequality
gives: Term (2)(ii) ≤ (B − 1)× nǫ.
Term (5)(a) = 0. No noise-forwarding i.e. X2j
is a function of (X2,j−1, Yˆ2,j−1) present in the conditioning.
Term (5)(b) = n[R1 + R˜1]. X1,j is uniformly chosen from
2n[R1+R˜1] codewords; choice unaffected by the conditioning.
Term (5)(c) = H(Zj |X1,j ,X2,j). ∵ Channel is DMC,
Zj ↔ (X1,j ,X2,j)↔ (X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[j−1] are Markov RVs.
Term (5)(d) = n[Rˆ− I(Yˆ2;X1, Z|X2)]. The first three
quantities in the conditioning, namely, (X1,X2,Z)j can be
used to reduce the number of possibilities for yˆ2,j as follows.
Knowledge of X2,j reduces the number of possibilities
for the compression sequence down to 2nRˆ. Now by the
condition
(
x1,j ,x2,j , yˆ2(|x2,j), zj
)
∈ T (n)ǫ , we can create an
equiprobable list of size 2n[Rˆ−I(Yˆ2;X1,Z|X2)].
Term (9)(b˜). Knowledge of X2,j reduces the possibilities
for Yˆ2,j down to 2
nRˆ. Given (X1,j+1,Zj+1), we can further
reduce the number of possible codewordsX2,j+1 in block j+1
down to 2n[R2−I(X2;Z|X1)]. Each such codeword corresponds
to a separate WZ bin, each of size 2n[Rˆ−R2]. Now the size of
the list of possible yˆ2 is 2
n[R2−I(X2;Z|X1)] × 2n[Rˆ−R2] where
the first term will be 1 if R2 < I(X2;Z|X1). In terms of
rate, we have n[✚✚R2 −min{R2, I(X2;Z|X1)}] + n[Rˆ−✚✚R2].
Conditioning on (X2,j ,X1,j ,Zj) gives us a further reduction
by: 2nI(Yˆ2;X1,Z|X2) so that, finally, the Term
(9)(b˜) = n[Rˆ−min{R2,I(X2;Z|X1)}−I(Yˆ2;X1, Z|X2)].
We now lower bound the RHS of (12) by first computing
two upper bounds for I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Zj). We have (see [3] and
[10])
I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Zj) ≤ nI(X1, X2;Z) + nǫ (u.b. I)
I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Zj) = I(X2j ;Zj) + I(X1,j ;Zj |X2,j)
≤ H(X2,j) + nI(X1;Z|X2) + nǫ (15)
≤ nR2 + nI(X1;Z|X2) + nǫ (u.b. II) =⇒
I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Zj)≤n[min{R2, I(X2;Z)}+I(X1;Z|X2)+ ǫ]
(16)
We use the above to obtain a lower bound for the RHS of (12)
to obtain, for a single block:
nR1 + nR˜1 + nmin{R2, I(X2;Z|X1)}]
− nmin{R2, I(X2;Z)} − nI(X1;Z|X2)− nǫ
• If R2 > I(X2;Z|X1) > I(X2;Z), then R˜1 ≈ I(X1;Z),
and the above becomes nR1 − nǫ.
• If R2 ∈ (I(X2;Z), I(X2;Z|X1)), then R˜1 =
I(X1, X2;Z)−R2, and we again have nR1 − nǫ.
Using this lower bound for RHS of (12) in (14), summing
over all B blocks and noting that the Bth block does not
contribute, and using the lower bound on (2)(ii) , we get
H(W [B−1]|Z[B]) ≥ (B − 1)× n[R1 − 2ǫ].
Case 2: I(X2;Y3) +WZ
Bob < I(X2;Z) +WZ
Eve
Case 2(a): WZEve<WZBob ( =⇒ I(X2;Y3)<I(X2;Z))
Term (18)(i) = nR2. Note that X2,j is a function
of (X2,j−1, Yˆ2,j−1). Yˆ2,j−1 is determined by
(X2,j−1,Y2,j−1), and Y2,j−1 ↔ (X1,j−1,X2,j−1) ↔
(X1,X2,Z,Y2, Yˆ2)
[j−2] form a Markov chain, implying
that X2,j ↔ (X1,j−1,X2,j−1,Zj−1)↔ (X1,X2,Z)
[j−2]
form a Markov chain. Conditioning on (X1,X2,Z)
[j−1]
reduces the possibilities for yˆ2 per WZ bin from 2
n[Rˆ−R2]
down to 2n[Rˆ−R2−WZ
Eve] which – by our choices – is
exponentially large in all Case 2 regimes. Hence every WZ
bin is possible in block j − 1, and so is every X2,j .
As in Case 1, Term (18)(ii) = n(R1 + R˜1). Since
R2 < I(X2;Z), and R˜1 ≈ I(X1;Z|X2), and since block B
does not contribute, the RHS of inequality (21b) becomes
n(B − 1)[R1 − ǫ]−H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B]). Now we
need only show that: H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B]) is
“small”. ∵ R2 < I(X2;Z), conditioning on Zj enables
Eve to decode X2,j correctly whp using (x2,j , zj) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ .
Given Wj , the number of possibilities for X1,j reduces from
2n[R1+R˜1] → 2n[R˜1]. Knowing both X2,j and Zj enables
Eve to decode X1,j using (x1,j ,x2,j , zj) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ at a rate
I(X1;Z|X2), which suffices, since R˜1 = I(X1;Z|X2) − ǫ.
By Fano: H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B]) ≈ (B − 1)× nǫ. So
we finally have: H(W [B−1]|Z[B]) ≥ (B−1)nR1−(B−1)nǫ.
Case 2(b): WZBob < WZEve
Case 2(b)(i): I(X2;Y3) < I(X2;Z) The calculation is
Equivocation calculation for Case 1: I(X2;Z) +WZ
Eve < I(X2;Y3) +WZ
Bob
H(W [B−1]|Z[B]) ≥ I(X
[B]
1 ;W
[B−1]|Z[B]) = H(X
[B]
1 |Z
[B])
(i)
−H(X
[B]
1 |W
[B−1],Z[B])
(ii)≈(B−1)nǫ (see main text)
(2)
Term (2)(i) : i.e. H(X
[B]
1 |Z
[B]) = H((X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[B])
(i)
−H((X2, Yˆ2)
[B]|(X1,Z)
[B])
(ii)
−H(Z[B])
(iii)
(3)
Term (3)(i) : i.e. H((X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[B]) =
B∑
j=1
H((X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)j |(X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[j−1])
Tj
(4)
In (4), Tj = H(X2,j |(X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[j−1])
(a)
+H(X1,j |X2,j , (X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[j−1])
(b)
+H(Zj |(X1,X2)j , (X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[j−1])
(c)
+H(Yˆ2,j |(X1,X2,Z)j , (X1,X2, Yˆ2,Z)
[j−1])
(d)
(5)
Terms (5)(a) = 0, (5)(b) = n[R1 + R˜1], (5)(c) = H(Zj |X1,j ,X2,j), (5)(d) = n[Rˆ− I(Yˆ2;X1, Z|X2)] (6)
(Foregoing evaluated in main text). We can write: Tj = n[R1 + R˜1 +H(Zj |X1,j ,X2,j) + Rˆ− I(Yˆ2;X1, Z|X2)] (7)
Term (3)(ii) i.e. H((X2, Yˆ2)
[B]|(X1,Z)
[B]) =
B∑
j=1
H((X2, Yˆ2)j |(X2, Yˆ2)
[j−1],X
[B]
1 ,Z
[B])
T˜j
(8)
In (8), T˜j = H(X2,j |(X2, Yˆ2)
[j−1], (X1,Z)
[B])
(=0, for the same reason as Term (5)(a) )
+H(Yˆ2,j |X2,j , (X2, Yˆ2)
[j−1], (X1,Z)
[B])
(b˜) (evaluated in main text)
(9)
= n[Rˆ−min{R2, I(X2;Z|X1)} − I(Yˆ2;X1, Z|X2)] (10)
Term (3)(iii) i.e. H(Z[B]) =
B∑
j=1
H(Zj |Z
[j−1]) ≤
B∑
j=1
H(Zj) (11)
Consider an individual block j = 1, 2, . . . , B − 1. We can lower bound
Tj − T˜j −H(Zj |Z
[j−1]) ≥ Tj − T˜j −H(Zj) = n[R1 + R˜1 +min{R2, I(X2;Z|X1)} − I(X1,j ,X2,j;Zj)] (12)
From (3), we have H(X
[B]
1 |Z
[B]) = (3)(i) − (3)(ii) − (3)(iii) ≥
B∑
j=1
[Tj − T˜j −H(Zj)] (13)
Above and (2) give H(W[B−1]|Z[B]) ≥
B−1∑
j=1
[Tj − T˜j −H(Zj)]−H(X
[B]
1 |W
[B−1],Z[B]) (14)
where in the summation above, we have replaced B ← B − 1, using the fact that since no new message is transmitted in
block B, X1,B is fixed beforehand and known to all parties, and so the last block’s contribution is zero.
virtually identical to Case 2(a) and is omitted.
Case 2(b)(ii) : I(X2;Z) < I(X2;Y3)
We choose R2 ∈ (I(X2;Z), I(X2;Y3)), Rˆ > I(X2;Z) +
WZEve, and Rˆ − R2 > WZ
Eve > WZBob. As in
Case 2(b)(i), neither Bob nor Eve can decode yˆ2. Our
choice of R2 < I(X2;Y3) ensures that Bob can decode x2.
Since both R2 > I(X2;Z)and Rˆ > I(X2;Z) + WZ
Eve,
Eve cannot decode x2 uniquely. Whether Eve decodes x2
nonuniquely or treats it as noise depends on two further
sub-cases, depending on whether I(X2;Y3) < or >
I(X2;Z|X1). Expanding by the chain rule, term (21b)(b)
=
B∑
j=1
H((X1,X2)j |(X1,X2)
[j−1],W [B−1],Z[B])
≤
B∑
j=1
H(X1,j ,X2,j |Wj ,Zj)
.
Wj in the conditioning reduces the possibilities for X1,j
from 2n[R1+R˜1] → 2nR˜1 . There are 2nR2 possibilities for
X2,j . Conditioning on Zj reduces the possibilities for the
pair (X1,j ,X2,j) from 2
n[R˜1+R2] → 2n[R˜1+R2−I(X1,X2;Z)].
So we have: H(X1,j ,X2,j |Wj ,Zj) ≈ n[R˜1 + R2 −
I(X1, X2;Z)]. Using this in (21b), and since R2 >
I(X2;Z) and block B does not contribute, we obtain:
Equivocation Calculation Case 2: I(X2;Y3) +WZ
Bob < I(X2;Z) +WZ
Eve
H(W [B−1]|ZB) = H((X1,X2,Z)
[B]) +H(W [B−1]|(X1,X2,Z)
[B])−H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B])−H(Z[B])
≥ H((X1,X2,Z)
[B])−H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B])−H(Z[B])
=
B∑
j=1
H((X1,X2,Z)j |(X1,X2,Z)
[j−1])
Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
−H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B])︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
−
B∑
j=1
H(Zj |Z
[j−1])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
(17)
Term (17)(a) is a summation. We expand each individual term Tj of (17)(a) by the chain rule:
Tj =H(X2,j |(X1,X2,Z)
[j−1])
(i)
+H(X1,j |X2,j , (X1,X2,Z)
[j−1])
(ii)
+H(Zj |X1,j ,X2,j , (X1,X2,Z)
[j−1])
(iii)
(18)
Using (see main text) Term (18)(i) = nR2, Term (18)(ii) = n[R1 + R˜1], Term (18)(iii) = H(Zj |X1,j ,X2,j) (19)
where the last equality in (19) holds for the same reason as in the evaluation of Term (5)(c) , i.e., channel is DMC.
Together with (18), the above gives Tj = nR2 + n[R1 + R˜1] +H(Zj |X1,j ,X2,j) (20)
Using (11), (20) in (17), re-arranging slightly, and with appropriate algebra, we obtain the inequality:
H(W [B−1]|ZB) ≥
B∑
j=1
n[R2 +R1 + R˜1]− I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Zj)−H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B]) (21a)
(16)
≥
B∑
j=1
n[R2 +R1 + R˜1 −min{R2, I(X2;Z)} − I(X1;Z|X2)− ǫ]−H((X1,X2)
[B]|W [B−1],Z[B])
(b)
(21b)
H(W [B−1]|Z[B]) ≥ (B − 1)nR1 − (B − 1)nǫ
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
It remains to be proven that our scheme achieves a higher
secrecy rate than [1]. NF achieves secrecy improvement by
attacking both Bob and Eve. Since Eve is affected more, Bob’s
secrecy rate can improve in certain regimes. In our scheme,
Alice has greater control over the relay’s channel codeword in
the next block. Our scheme’s decoding delay of two blocks is
to be preferred to [1]’s backward decoding delay of B blocks.
Lastly, our MBEq calculation is, besides [6] by the author, one
of the first of its kind – all other MBEq calculations, such as
[7], to the best of our knowledge, were made in the context
of LM-NNC without WZ binning. Thus our equivocation
calculations may be of independent interest. The next problem
to be tackled is the four node dedicated relay broadcast channel
with mutual secrecy requirement where the relay is “strong”
with respect to one receiver and decode-forwards its intended
message, and “weak” (or possibly untrusted) wrt the other
receiver, and applies a version of compress-forward to its
intended message. We foresee substantial technical challenges,
but believe the effort will be worth it.
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